

(e) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter until the restrictions under subsection (d)(1) are terminated pursuant to subsection (d)(3), the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of State, after consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall jointly submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that describes—

(1) the efforts of the United States Executive Directors of international financial institutions to comply with their respective responsibilities under subsection (d)(1);

(2) the status of the Taliban's adherence to international human rights principles that are recognized by the United States; and

(3) the degree to which the Taliban has met its commitments under the peace agreement signed by the United States and the Taliban in Doha, Qatar on February 29, 2020.

SA 4489. Mr. RISCH submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 3867 submitted by Mr. REED and intended to be proposed to the bill H.R. 4350, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2022 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the appropriate place in title XII, insert the following:

SEC. ____ . AUTHORITY TO ENTER INTO A COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT TO PROTECT CIVILIANS IN SAUDI ARABIA AND THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES FROM WEAPONIZED UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The Houthis in Yemen have significantly intensified the number of cross-border strikes against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia since January 2021, using a combination of increasingly sophisticated Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and cruise missiles to target civilian infrastructure, bases, commercial shipping, and major population centers across the Kingdom with unprecedented frequency.

(2) The United Nations has noted the Houthis have deployed extended long-range UAVs with the capacity to strike deep into Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates since at least January 2018.

(3) Between January and April 2021, the Houthis launched upward of 150 UAVs into Saudi Arabia, threatening the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's sovereignty and security, as well as the lives of more than 70,000 United States nationals living there.

(4) Houthi spokesperson Yahya Sarea responded to a realistic peace proposal presented by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in March 2021, by threatening “to carry out stronger and harsher military attacks in the coming period.”

(5) United States Government officials, including Special Envoy Timothy Lenderking, have publicly underscored the crucial role the Government of Iran plays in driving this growing and continuous threat that emanates from the Houthis in Yemen.

(6) According to United States officials and United Nations experts, the Government of Iran, alongside its Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah, are providing sophisticated weapons systems and military training to the Houthis, including technical assistance on the development and employment of UAVs and ballistic missiles.

(7) The Houthi rebels have also made significant advances in their domestic military industrial capacity in recent years, drawing on Iranian sourced components, including guidance systems to develop several new advanced platforms like the Burkan medium range ballistic missile and the Sammad drone series that have extend the Houthi's reach deep into Saudi Arabia.

(8) The Houthi's growing arsenal of increasingly sophisticated drones, and ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles pose a direct threat to United States interests, particularly as relates to regional security, the safety of United States nationals, and the trajectory of United Nations-led peace talks.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the United States should improve cooperation with allies and likeminded partners to systematically map out, expose, and disrupt missile and drone procurement networks used by the Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen;

(2) the partner countries of the United States in the Arabian Peninsula face urgent and emerging threats from unmanned aerial systems and other unmanned aerial vehicles;

(3) joint research and development to counter unmanned aerial systems will serve the national security interests of the United States and its partners in the Arabian Peninsula;

(4) development of counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) technology will reduce the impacts of these attacks, build deterrence, and increase regional stability;

(5) the United States and partners in the Arabian Peninsula should continue to work together to protect United States citizens and personnel in the Middle East and civilians in the Arabian Peninsula in the face of the threat from unmanned aerial systems; and

(6) the United States Government should use all leverage at its disposal to pressure the Houthis to de-escalate cross border attacks, cease their offensive in Marib, and meaningfully engage in United Nations-led peace talks.

(c) AUTHORITY TO ENTER INTO AGREEMENT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The President is authorized to enter into a cooperative project agreement with countries in the Arabian Peninsula under the authority of section 27 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2767) to carry out research on and development, testing, evaluation, and joint production (including follow-on support) of defense articles and defense services to detect, track, and destroy armed unmanned aerial systems that threaten the United States and its partners in the Arabian Peninsula.

(2) APPLICABLE REQUIREMENTS.—The cooperative project agreement described in paragraph (1)—

(A) shall provide that any activities carried out pursuant to the agreement are subject to—

(i) the applicable requirements described in subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) of section 27(b)(2) of the Arms Export Control Act; and

(ii) any other applicable requirements of the Arms Export Control Act with respect to the use, transfer, and security of such defense articles and defense services under that Act; and

(B) shall establish a framework to negotiate the rights to intellectual property developed under the agreement.

(d) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION WITH RESPECT TO USE OF MILITARY FORCE.—Nothing in this section may be construed as an authorization for the use of military force.

(e) ARABIAN PENINSULA DEFINED.—In this section, the term “Arabian Peninsula” means Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi

Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.

SA 4490. Mr. RISCH submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 3867 submitted by Mr. REED and intended to be proposed to the bill H.R. 4350, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2022 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the end of subtitle E of title XII, add the following:

SEC. 1253. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR COUNTERING CHINESE INFLUENCE FUND.

(a) COUNTERING CHINESE INFLUENCE FUND.—There is authorized to be appropriated \$300,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 for the Countering Chinese Influence Fund to counter the malign influence of the Chinese Communist Party globally. Amounts appropriated pursuant to this authorization are authorized to remain available until expended and shall be in addition to amounts otherwise authorized to be appropriated to counter such influence.

(b) CONSULTATION REQUIRED.—The obligation of funds appropriated or otherwise made available to counter the malign influence of the Chinese Communist Party globally shall be subject to prior consultation with, and consistent with section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2394-1), the regular notification procedures of—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(c) POLICY GUIDANCE, COORDINATION, AND APPROVAL.—

(1) COORDINATOR.—The Secretary of State shall designate an existing senior official of the Department at the rank of Assistant Secretary or above to provide policy guidance, coordination, and approval for the obligation of funds authorized pursuant to subsection (a).

(2) DUTIES.—The senior official designated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be responsible for—

(A) on an annual basis, the identification of specific strategic priorities for using the funds authorized to be appropriated by subsection (a), such as geographic areas of focus or functional categories of programming that funds are to be concentrated within, consistent with the national interests of the United States and the purposes of this division;

(B) the coordination and approval of all programming conducted using the funds authorized to be appropriated by subsection (a), based on a determination that such programming directly counters the malign influence of the Chinese Communist Party, including specific activities or policies advanced by the Chinese Communist Party, pursuant to the strategic objectives of the United States, as established in the 2017 National Security Strategy, the 2018 National Defense Strategy, and other relevant national and regional strategies as appropriate;

(C) ensuring that all programming approved bears a sufficiently direct nexus to such acts by the Chinese Communist Party described in subsection (d) and adheres to the requirements outlined in subsection (e); and

(D) conducting oversight, monitoring, and evaluation of the effectiveness of all programming conducted using the funds authorized to be appropriated by subsection (a) to ensure that it advances United States interests and degrades the ability of the Chinese Communist Party, to advance activities that align with subsection (d) of this section.

(3) INTERAGENCY COORDINATION.—The senior official designated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall, in coordinating and approving programming pursuant to paragraph (2), seek to—

(A) conduct appropriate interagency consultation; and

(B) ensure, to the maximum extent practicable, that all approved programming functions in concert with other Federal activities to counter the malign influence and activities of the Chinese Communist Party.

(4) ASSISTANT COORDINATOR.—The Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development shall designate a senior official at the rank of Assistant Administrator or above to assist and consult with the senior official designated pursuant to paragraph (1).

(d) MALIGN INFLUENCE.—In this section, the term “malign influence” with respect to the Chinese Communist Party should be construed to include acts conducted by the Chinese Communist Party or entities acting on its behalf that—

(1) undermine a free and open international order;

(2) advance an alternative, repressive international order that bolsters the Chinese Communist Party’s hegemonic ambitions and is characterized by coercion and dependency;

(3) undermine the national security or sovereignty of the United States or other countries; or

(4) undermine the economic security of the United States or other countries, including by promoting corruption.

(e) COUNTERING MALIGN INFLUENCE.—In this section, countering malign influence through the use of funds authorized to be appropriated by subsection (a) shall include efforts to—

(1) promote transparency and accountability, and reduce corruption, including in governance structures targeted by the malign influence of the Chinese Communist Party;

(2) support civil society and independent media to raise awareness of and increase transparency regarding the negative impact of activities related to the Belt and Road Initiative and associated initiatives;

(3) counter transnational criminal networks that benefit, or benefit from, the malign influence of the Chinese Communist Party;

(4) encourage economic development structures that help protect against predatory lending schemes, including support for market-based alternatives in key economic sectors, such as digital economy, energy, and infrastructure;

(5) counter activities that provide undue influence to the security forces of the People’s Republic of China;

(6) expose misinformation and disinformation of the Chinese Communist Party’s propaganda, including through programs carried out by the Global Engagement Center; and

(7) counter efforts by the Chinese Communist Party to legitimize or promote authoritarian ideology and governance models.

SA 4491. Mr. RISCH submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 3867 submitted by Mr. REED and intended to be proposed to

the bill H.R. 4350, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2022 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the end of subtitle E of title XII of division A, add the following:

SEC. 1253. ANNUAL REVIEW ON THE PRESENCE OF CHINESE COMPANIES IN UNITED STATES CAPITAL MARKETS.

(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.—The term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(B) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;

(C) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate;

(D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;

(E) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and

(F) the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives.

(2) PRC.—The term “PRC” means the People’s Republic of China.

(b) REPORT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the following 5 years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit an unclassified report to the appropriate committees of Congress that describes the risks posed to the United States by the presence in United States capital markets of companies incorporated in the PRC.

(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report required under paragraph (1) shall—

(A) identify companies incorporated in the PRC that—

(i) are listed or traded on at least 1 stock exchange within the United States, including over-the-counter market and “A Shares” added to indexes and exchange-traded funds out of mainland exchanges in the PRC; and

(ii) based on the factors for consideration described in paragraph (3), have knowingly and materially contributed to—

(I) activities that undermine United States national security;

(II) serious abuses of internationally recognized human rights; or

(III) a substantially increased financial risk exposure for United States-based investors;

(B) describe the activities of the companies identified pursuant to subparagraph (A), and the implications of such activities for the United States; and

(C) develop policy recommendations for the Federal Government, State governments, United States financial institutions, United States equity and debt exchanges, and other relevant stakeholders to address the risks posed by the presence in United States capital markets of the companies identified pursuant to subparagraph (A).

(3) FACTORS FOR CONSIDERATION.—In completing the report under paragraph (1), the Secretary of State shall consider whether a company identified pursuant to paragraph (2)(A)—

(A) has materially contributed to the development or manufacture, or sold or facilitated procurement by the People’s Liberation Army of the PRC, of lethal military

equipment or component parts of such equipment;

(B) has contributed to the construction and militarization of features in the South China Sea;

(C) has been sanctioned by the United States or has been determined to have conducted business with sanctioned entities;

(D) has engaged in an act or a series of acts of intellectual property theft;

(E) has engaged in corporate or economic espionage;

(F) has contributed to the proliferation of nuclear or missile technology in violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions or United States sanctions;

(G) has contributed to the repression of religious and ethnic minorities within the PRC, including in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region or Tibet Autonomous Region;

(H) has contributed to the development of technologies that enable censorship directed or directly supported by the PRC government;

(I) has failed to comply fully with Federal securities laws (including required audits by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board) and “material risk” disclosure requirements of the Securities and Exchange Commission; or

(J) has contributed to other activities or behavior determined to be relevant by the Secretary of State.

(c) REPORT FORM.—The report required under subsection (b)(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(d) PUBLICATION.—The unclassified portion of the report required under subsection (b)(1) shall be made accessible to the public online through relevant United States Government websites.

SA 4492. Mr. RISCH submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 3867 submitted by Mr. REED and intended to be proposed to the bill H.R. 4350, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2022 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the end of subtitle E of title XII, add the following:

SEC. 1253. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON INDO-PACIFIC REGION.

It shall be the policy of the United States to—

(1) prioritize the Indo-Pacific region in United States foreign policy, and prioritize resources for achieving United States political and military objectives in the region;

(2) exercise freedom of operations in the international waters and airspace in the Indo-Pacific maritime domains, which are critical to the prosperity, stability, and security of the Indo-Pacific region;

(3) maintain forward-deployed forces in the Indo-Pacific region, including a rotational bomber presence, integrated missile defense capabilities, long-range precision fires, undersea warfare capabilities, and diversified and resilient basing and rotational presence, including support for pre-positioning strategies;

(4) strengthen and deepen the alliances and partnerships of the United States to build capacity and capabilities, increase multilateral partnerships, modernize communications architecture, address anti-access and area denial challenges, and increase joint exercises and security cooperation efforts;